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RECENT DECISIONS
when the court was given the power to act at all. However, power
to act at all has been restricted by Congress. The Norris La Guardia
Act has restricted, the court to enjoin in circumstances designated in
the Act. The limiting of this power of the courts was held to be
a valid exercise of the power of Congress, 20 for Congress may within
fixed limits give either whole or restricted jurisdiction to the District
Courts."
MIcHEL J. PULITO
Pleading-Married Woman's Right to Sue in Her Own Name.-
Singer v. Singer (14 N.W. (2d) 43, Wisconsin 1944) was an action
by Angeline F. Singer, plaintiff, against Anthony A. Singer, Max
Singer, and Catherine Fuerstenburg, defendants, to recover for dam-
ages sustained by her as a result of a willful conspiracy among the
defendants, plaintiff's husband, his brother, and their employee.
Anthony A. Singer, the husband demurred to the complaint. From
an order sustaining the demurrer, the plaintiff appealed.
The court held that inasmuch as the statute 246.071 did not give
a married woman the right to maintain an action in her own name
other than for injury to person or character, or the alienation of her
husband's affections without joining him, she must sue in her hus-
band's name in an action for conspiracy to injure her marital rights;
and that as it was manifest that the husband could not be both
plaintiff and defendant in the same action, the cause of action for
conspiracy must fail.
The statute 6.0152 which gave women equal rights and privileges
was construed as to be limited by the earlier statute allowing women
20 nternational Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 305
U.S. 662, 59 Sup. Ct. 364, 83 L.Ed. 430 (1939).21293 U.S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110, 79 L.Ed. 688 (1934).
1 WIs. STAT. § 246.07 "May sue in her own-name. Every married woman may
sue in her own name and shall have all the remedies of an unmarried woman
in regard to her separate property or business and to recover the earnings
secured to her by 246.05 and 246.06, and shall be liable to be sued in respect
to her separate property or business, and judgment may be rendered against
her and be enforced against her and her separate property in all respects as
if she were unmarried. And any married woman may bring and maintain an
action in her own name for any injury to her person or character the same
as if she were sole. She may also bring and maintain an action in her own
name and for her own benefit, for the alienation and the loss of the affection
and society of her husband. Any judgment recovered in any such action shall
be the separate property and estate of such married woman. Nothing herein
contained shall affect the right of the husband to maintain a separate action
for any such injuries as are now provided by law."
2 WIs. STAT. § 6.015 "Women to have equal rights. (1) Women shall have the
same rights and privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage,
freedom of contract, choice of residence for voting purposes, jury service,
holding office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of children,
and in all other respects. The various courts, executive and administrative
19441
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the right to sue only under certain circumstances. In Singer v. Singer,
the construction put upon section 6.015 still allows a woman only the
right to sue in her own name for injury to her person and character
and the alienation of husband's affection as provided in section 246.07.
At common law there existed a legal unity, with the personality
of the wife merged in that of the husband. This conception (exempli-
fied by the rule that the husband had title to the wife's property)
was the result of conditions no longer existent. Wisconsin by statutes
and decisions is removing legal disabilities of the married woman
gradually equalizing her position.with that of her husband.
In Wait v. Pierce,3 the court discussed the contention that section
6.015 was intended to effect the suffrage amendment and to give
women equality with men before the law, but not to affect the rights
of married women. Referring to the portion of the statute obviously
intended for married women, since it concerned rights already held
by the feme sole, the court said: "It seems too clear for argument
that section 6.015 further modified the rights of husband and wife as
they existed at common law and that it was designed to place them
on a basis of equality before the law not only in particulars men-
tioned but in 'all other respects' ".
The question in the leading case, whether a married woman has
the right to sue in her own name, is one of procedure. In Thompson
v. Thompson4 the right of a married woman to sue in her own name
in tort is recognized as set forth in a statute. However, it was held
she had no cause of action against her husband in a case of assault
and battery as a matter of substantive law.
It would seem that the legislative intent in enacting section 6.015
was to give the wife and husband equality before the law as to the
right to sue where there is a cause of action, but not to wholly change
the common law relations between them.
In New York, a narrow construction was placed on early statutes
affecting women's rights.5 This was modified in 1937, by Section 57,
officers shall construe the statutes where the masculine gender is used to in-
clude feminine gender unless such construction will deny to females the
special protection and privileges which they now enjoy for the general welfare.
The courts, executive and administrative officers shall make all necessary rules
and provisions to carry out the intent and purposes of this statute."
3 Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
4 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L.Ed. 1180, 30 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 1153 (1910).
5 Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927). Lapides v. Lapides, 256
N.Y. Supp. 798, 143 Misc. 549 (1932); Leventhal v. Lieberman, 262 N.Y. 209,
186 N.E. 675, 88 A.L.R. 782 (1933); Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249
N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 64 A.L.R. 293 (1928).
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Art. IV, Domestic Relations Law, Laws of 1937, c. 669,8 which clear-
ly expressed the right of a married woman to maintain a tort action
in her own name.
The technical distinction made in Singer v. Singer seems out of
accord with the legislative intent of Section 6.015 to place women
on a basis of equality before the law. If as a practical matter this
construction should cause hardship, the legislature should amend the
statute giving definite equality as to right to sue similar to that exist-
ing in New York.
LAVERNE L. REICHOW.
Taxation-Immunity of Federal Property from State and Local
Taxes.&-In reversing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, in
United States & Mesta Machine Co. v. County of Alleghany, 64
Sup. Ct. 908,88 L.Ed. 845 (1944), the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the long standing immunity of federal property from state
and local taxes.-
In the present case the war department contracted with Mesta
Machine Co. for the manufacture of ordnance. 2 Since the plant was
not equipped for this type of work, it was agreed that the additional
machinery required should be furnished at Government cost and re-
main the property of the United States. Machinery was to be ac-
quired by Mesta as independent contractor by purchase; Mesta could
manufacture it; the government could furnish it. That which was
bought or built was inspected and compensated by the government
and title was to vest at delivery at site of work and inspection and
acceptance. For rental of one dollar the government leased to Mesta
6 N. Y. STAT. Art. IV, No. 57, Domestic Relations Law, Laws of 1937. "Right
of action by or against married woman and by husband or wife against the
other, for torts-A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her
person, property or character for an injury arising out of the marital rela-
tion, as if unmarried. She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts, her hus-
band is not liable for such acts unless they were done by his actual coercion or
instigation; and such coercion or instigation shall not be presumed, but must
be proved. A married woman has a right of action against her husband for
his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined
in section 37a of the general construction law, or resulting in any injury to
her property, as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for
her wrongful or tortious acts resulting in any such personal injury to her
husband or to his property, as if they were unmarried.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), which case involved the state's
right to tax issues of notes of a bank of the United States. The Court held it
a tax on the means of the government to execute one of its powers and the
sovereignty of the State did not extend to those means.
2 Clallam Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L.Ed. 328 (1923).
Held that a state could not tax the property of a corporation organized by
Federal Government by act of 1918 for production of war materials, the
property which is conveyed to it, or bought with money of the United States.
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